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Abstract—The sharing of hardware platforms in multi-tenant
environments is a growing security concern. Microarchitectural
timing-based covert channels allow tunneling information out of
a compromised cloud instance, thus bypassing information flow
policies. Significant research efforts have been carried out in
order to address the super-set of timing channels. Nevertheless,
new attacks keep on being published while disregarding the
latest academic efforts, arguing that the relevant defences have
not yet been deployed. In order to bridge the gap between
vulnerabilities and countermeasures, we challenge state-of-the-art
mitigation techniques by constructing the first cross-VM covert
channel that is resilient against all known defences, whether they
are already deployed or still theoretical. Defence strategies that
are relevant with covert channels are surveyed, and a list of
requirements is constructed for the new attack. Then, we re-visit
the exploitation of the x86 memory bus lock, and launch the
proposed covert communication channel across two AWS EC2
instances. While simple in design, the proposed implementation
shows that x86 microarchitectures still present salient vulnerabil-
ities, and that state-of-the-art defence strategies—even theoretical
ones—remain unsuccessful at hindering data leakage in multi-
tenant environments. Finally, a strategy to mitigate the remaining
vulnerability is suggested, along with a comparison against the
ARMv8 processor architecture.
Index Terms—Covert channel, cloud security, data confiden-
tiality
I. INTRODUCTION
Microarchitectural timing-based attacks are software-
launched exploits which leverage the sharing of a processor
among multiple tenants, in order to compromise sensitive
information. These attacks can either take the form of a side
channel, where the victim is accidentally leaking information,
or the form of a covert channel, where the attacker has infected
the victim with a malicious sending-end that deliberately trans-
mits information. Microarchitectural covert and side channels
have been increasingly popular in the last decade, and even
more since the release of the Spectre and Meltdown attacks [1],
[2]. In response, a plethora of mitigation strategies has been
proposed by academics, from new hardware designs through
software partitioning to anomaly detection.
These defence strategies often aim at closing a
PRIME+PROBE [3] covert or side channel, omitting attacks
which are not based on cache exploitation. Unfortunately,
authors of defence strategies rarely challenge their proposal
with all the artifacts available to an adversary, such as
shared buses, interconnects, and system-level resources
(e.g. DRAM). In parallel, new attacks consider a set of
countermeasures, usually the ones already deployed in the
targeted environment, and aim at demonstrating a residual
threat despite these existing countermeasures. A trend that we
observe is that attacks often forget to take into account the
latest developments in terms of defences, arguing that these
are not deployed by OS or cloud providers. Therefore, it is
difficult to assess the novelty of these attacks, as they might
already have been addressed by recent works.
With the intent of bringing coherence in this cat-and-
mouse game, we perform a retrospective analysis on state-of-
the-art attack and defence techniques. More specifically, we
propose a microarchitectural covert channel that allows cross-
VM communication in a public cloud, while discarding the
usage of artifacts which are theoretically made unavailable by
recently proposed countermeasures. Covert and side channel
attacks differ in the attack scenario, however they share the
underlying mechanisms for leaking information. Therefore, the
study accounts for all defence strategies, as long as they are
relevant with the covert channel attack scenario (e.g. constant-
time implementations of cryptographic algorithms are only
suitable against side channel attacks).
Microarchitectural covert channels are particularly interest-
ing when there is no alternative means of leaking information
in a non-conspicuous manner, e.g. to avoid generating network
traffic and associated logs [4]. They are relevant with advanced
persistent threats, where the attacker employs cutting-edge
techniques in order to maintain long-term intrusion and data
exfiltration capabilities. Therefore, covert channels are ideal
candidates for stealthy leakage on high-profile targets. This
study shows that a motivated attacker can easily make his
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way around state-of-the-art mitigation strategies, even if these
were actually implemented in the targeted environment.
Auditing strategies have been proposed against timing chan-
nels [5]–[8]. These aim at detecting abnormal behaviours at
runtime, and deploying reactive measures accordingly (e.g.
interrupting the suspected workload, migrating a VM, tem-
porarily injecting noise, etc.). Because the sustainability of the
auditing approach is highly correlated to the ability of avoiding
false positives, multiple machine learning-based techniques
have also emerged [9]–[13]. The main drawback of auditing
is that it is usually tailored for specific workloads such
as cryptographic computations. Thus its applicability against
microarchitectural covert channels remains an open question,
as they might not have an easily identifiable signature. Further-
more, auditing does not aim at closing a malicious behaviour,
but at detecting it. While the decision is made to apply
reactive measures, sensitive information such as cryptographic
keys might have already been leaked. Auditing strategies are
not capable of closing a microarchitectural covert channel in
a deterministic way, and their practicality has already been
questioned due to their performance cost [14]. Therefore,
they are not considered viable countermeasures against such
attacks.
In this study, we first analyse a chosen set of mitigation
techniques, and extract the requirements for bypassing them.
Secondly, we demonstrate how all existing covert channels
can be closed with countermeasures suggested in academia.
Thirdly, we revisit the x86 memory bus covert channel and
test it against the requirements previously established. The
proposed attack is then deployed across two AWS EC2 in-
stances and tested on several microarchitectures. Finally a
discussion on how to close the remaining covert channel is
provided, along with a comparison against the ARMv8.2-A
architecture that has recently arrived on the Infrastructure-as-a-
Service (IaaS) market. Overall, the study shows that there is no
known countermeasure that could mitigate the proposed covert
channel, despite an extensive review of defence strategies.
The contributions of this paper are the following,
• We evaluate state-of-the-art covert channel attacks against
recently proposed covert and side channels defence tech-
niques, and discuss how all cross-VM channels proposed
in academia can effectively be closed.
• We revisit the x86 bus lock vulnerability in order to
bypass recently proposed countermeasures. The covert
channel is tested in the AWS EC2 environment on three
different x86-64 microarchitectures.
• We propose alternative mitigation strategies and dis-
cuss the challenges of deploying the covert channel on
ARMv8.2-A microarchitectures.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II provides the
necessary background on hardware architecture, as well as
related literature on cross-VM covert channel attacks. Section
III consists of an analysis of state-of-the-art defences against
side and covert channels, along with a discussion on the
feasibility of covert channel attacks against these defences.
Section IV presents our new instance of the memory bus covert
channel. Section V reports the results of the covert channel
evaluation. SectionVI provides suggestions on mitigating the
covert channel, along with a comparison with the ARMv8.2-A
architecture. We conclude in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
A. Processor Overview
In this paper, the term processor refers to the entire die,
which contains the shared last-level cache (LLC), the in-
tegrated memory controller, and the cores. Cores contain
individual instruction (L1-I) and data (L1-D) caches, and
potentially a unified L2 cache depending on the processor
model. Cores also contain one or two physical CPU(s) each.
Finally, the CPU is the set of execution units and other logic
required for instruction execution, e.g. translation lookaside
buffer (TLB), branch target buffer (BTB), branch history buffer
(BHB), return-stack buffer (RSB), etc. We note that before the
advent of non-uniform memory access (NUMA), the front-side
bus architecture was prominent (see Figure 1). This memory
bus quickly became a bottleneck as CPU clock speeds kept
increasing. With the NUMA architecture, the front-side bus
was replaced by an interconnect between processors, with
each processor managing its own portion of DRAM through
a memory controller integrated directly into the die.
B. Memory Operations
During the execution of a program, data might be loaded
from or stored to caches. Upon such operation, the memory
management unit (MMU) translates the virtual address into a
physical address, computes an index from the address of the
requested data, and computes the tag of the cache line that
contains the requested data. The index is used to point to a
set of cache lines, and the tag is used to point to a specific
cache line within this set. Finally, an offset computed from
the variable’s address is used to point to a specific portion of
the cache line.
If the cache line is not present at any cache level, known as
a cache miss, a request is issued to the memory controller in
order to fetch the data from DRAM. The data is then stored
into the cache, known as a cache line fill, and is sent back
to the CPU. The next access to the cached data will result in
a cache hit. A store operation consists of modifying a cache
line, and storing it back to memory (depending on the write-
policy) via the store buffer. Prior to modifying data, the cache
line must be loaded. If it is not present at any cache level, it is
called a write miss, which triggers a cache line fill. Otherwise
it is a write hit.
C. Cross-VM Covert Channel Attacks
Ristenpart et al. [15] studied the problem of VM co-location
on the AWS EC2 service. They used the LLC to assert the
co-residency between two communicating VMs. Similarly, Xu
et al. [16] explored the vulnerability of L2 caches for covert
channel attacks on an EC2 instance. Wu et al. [17] proposed
exploiting the memory bus as an alternative to cache-based
covert channels, thus overcoming the addressing uncertainty.
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Fig. 1: Front-side bus architecture.
Later, the memory bus attack was revisited by Liu et al. [18]
to use non-temporal instructions on the receiving-end, so as to
mitigate the effect of cache pollution. Yet, they demonstrate
that their covert channel can be closed by introducing noise
on high resolution timers. Pessl et al. [19] suggested using the
DRAM row-buffer as a communication medium between two
VMs. Liu et al. [20] re-used a PRIME+PROBE primitive in
order to build a cross-VM covert channel as a vector for side
channel attacks against GnuPG libraries. Maurice et al. [21]
designed a robust LLC-based covert channel attack, allegedly
enabling the establishment of a rogue SSH session across AWS
EC2 instances. Sullivan et al. [22] revisited the exploitation of
simultaneous multithreading using the memory order buffer
for cross-VM leakage in the AWS EC2 and GCE services.
More recently, Semal et al. [23] proposed a cross-VM covert
channel entirely based on the integrated memory controller.
III. ANALYSIS OF STATE-OF-THE-ART DEFENCES
This section surveys and analyses relevant mitigation tech-
niques against microarchitectural leakage channels, namely
noise injection, software partitioning, and hardware partition-
ing. Whether a timing variation is created accidentally or
intentionally, the mechanisms to modulate microarchitectural
states remains similar. Therefore relevant countermeasures
against timing-based side channels are also considered. Other
countermeasures which are not relevant include constant-
time execution, symbolic execution, state flushing, and noise
injection within cryptographic implementations.
A. Noise Injection
Noise injection consists of downgrading the accuracy of
timing variations’ measurement, either by injecting noise in
the high-resolution clock sources, or by injecting randomness
in the cache replacement policy:
1) Noise injection on timers: This approach consists of
jittering the timestamps of high-resolution timers [18], [24]–
[26]. Being able to measure the latency of a single memory
operation is crucial in timing channel attacks, as it leads to
the interpretation of the activity of the victim (or sender).
The x86 ISA features the rdtsc and rdtscp instructions
which capture a time-stamp from the time-stamp counter
(TSC), allowing timing measurements with a sub-nanosecond
resolution. These are accessible from any non-privileged user
program. Other timing sources, such as the wall clock provided
by the operating system, are usually not accurate enough to
measure a timing variation of a few clock cycles. For example,
in [23], the sender’s activity generates an overhead of only 6.5
CPU clock cycles. At a frequency of 2.4 GHz, this amounts to
a time span of 2.7 ns. Therefore, the attacker can neither rely
on the high-resolution timer which can be made unreliable by
countermeasures, nor on the operating systems clock sources
which lack accuracy. In order to account for noise injection
on high-resolution timers, we set the following condition:
Requirement 1: Noise injection on timers
The covert channel shall not rely on the rdtsc nor
rdtscp instruction for measuring timing variations.
2) Noise injection on caches: This approach aims at pre-
venting an attacker from learning about the victim’s working
cache set. Wang and Lee [27] suggested integrating permu-
tations in the cache index computation, while Qureshi et al.
[28] used randomised mappings based on the encryption of the
cache line’s physical address. These will result in the victim’s
accesses to stop conflicting with the attacker’s cache sets.
Alternatively, Fang et al. [29] suggested having the prefetch
controller issuing requests to the L1 cache in order to tamper
the timing observations of the receiving-end. For instance,
in an m-way set associative cache, if m cache misses are
observed when sending a 1, and none are observed when
sending a 0. the prefetch controller will bring this number
to m/2 all the time, such that the receiver is no longer
capable of distinguishing a 1 from a 0. If generalised, these
strategies can hinder cache-based covert channels that depend
on the ability to find congruent addresses. Other proposals
[30]–[32] studied bespoke cache replacement policies as an
alternative to the vulnerable on-demand policy. Taking the
example of the random-fill approach [30], if a cache miss
occurs, the requested cache line is sent to the CPU but it is not
necessarily stored in the cache. Instead, a “neighbour” cache
line is randomly selected within a fixed address range around
the requested cache line. If the same cache line is requested
thereafter, it might result in a cache hit. The uncertainty
contributes to inhibiting the leakage of information as to
whether the victim accessed a specific cache line or not.
This countermeasure is also relevant to cache covert channels
such as FLUSH+RELOAD [33]. In order to account for noise
injection on caches, we set the following condition:
Requirement 2: Noise injection on caches
The attacker cannot rely on the latency of cache ac-
cesses. Therefore, data caches such as the L1-D, the
L2, and the LLC shall not be used as a communication
medium.
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B. Software Partitioning
Software cache partitioning, also known as cache colouring,
consists of isolating sensitive data by means of isolating a set
of cache lines for a given security domain [27], [34], [35].
Recall that in order to address data in (set-associative) caches,
the MMU computes an index and an offset from the physical
address. The bits that belong to both the physical page number
and the cache line index are the colour bits. Figure 2 is an
example of virtual-to-physical translation of a 64-bit address,
with 6 bits of offset (i.e. cache line size is 26 = 64 bytes),
9 bits of index (i.e. way size is 29 = 512 entries), and 3
colour bits. Cache colouring states that physical pages which
differ in any of the colour bits can never be mapped in the
same cache set. That is, if the physical memory pages of
two processes have at least one different colour bit, these
can never exploit congruency to launch cache attacks such
as PRIME+PROBE or EVICT+RELOAD [3]. In a sense, cache
colouring behaves like a dynamic clustering technique which
guarantees that two clusters can never share a cache set. Liu et
al. [36] suggested another form of software cache partitioning
by leveraging Intel’s Cache Allocation Technology (CAT) [37],
in order to lock down portions of the LLC during execution.
As for FLUSH+RELOAD, Zhou et al. [38] proposed a state
machine which prevents a shared memory page being accessed
by two security domains at the same time.
Beyond cache colouring, other forms of software parti-
tioning have been proposed. Disabling page sharing [39]
hinders attacks which depend on the availability of shared
memory such as FLUSH+RELOAD and FLUSH+FLUSH [14].
Disabling simultaneous multi-threading (SMT) [40] prevents
two hardware threads from exploiting contention among CPU-
level resources such as execution units [41], the BTB [42], the
RSB [43], or the MOB [22].
Requirement 3: Software partitioning
The covert channel must remain functional when shared
memory and SMT are disabled. Also, set-associative
caches shall not be used as a communication medium.
C. Hardware Partitioning
Hardware cache partitioning consists in providing physical
isolation among the working cache sets of each tenant [27],
[44], [45]. For example, Wang and Lee [27] suggested a cache
line locking mechanism, by means of an ISA extension, which
prevents another process from evicting the cache line. An L
tag indicates whether the cache line is locked, and an ID
tag indicates the process to whom the cache line belongs.
Fundamentally, hardware cache partitioning results in the same
effects as software cache partitioning. The main difference lies
in the deployment of the countermeasure. Therefore, hardware
cache partitioning does not result in additional requirements.
As for other components than caches, Wang et al. [46]
proposed a time-division multiplexing technique in order to
prevent the exploitation of the shared integrated memory
controller. Similarly, Wang et al. [47] devised a priority-based
mechanism for the shared on-chip network. These approaches
Fig. 2: Virtual-to-physical translation of a 64-bit address on an Intel
E6550 processor [48]. The cache line offset is determined by bits 0
to 5, the cache line index is determined by bits 6 to 14, and the page
offset is determined by bits 0 to 12. Colour bits range from bit 12 to
bit 14.
consist in scheduling accesses to the memory controller and
the interconnect such that different security domains cannot
conflict with each other. We note that the effect of this
countermeasure on DRAM-based covert channels that target
external NUMA nodes remains an open-question.
Additionally, Gruss et al. [14] advocated making the rdtsc
and clflush instructions privileged. While it would not
completely close the covert channels which rely on these
instructions, it would severely question the practicality of
the attack. The adversary model (see Section IV-A) requires
for the environment of the victim to be compromised with
a malicious colluding software. The above-mentioned coun-
termeasure would force this malware to be executing with
privileges. Also, the adversary model assumes that the attacker
does not have privileges. Therefore, using such instructions is
not allowed. In order to account for hardware partitioning, we
set the following condition:
Requirement 4: Hardware partitioning
The covert channel shall not rely on either the mem-
ory controller or the interconnect as a communication
medium. Furthermore, the attacker cannot execute priv-
ileged code. The rdtsc and clflush instructions are
considered privileged and are thus unavailable.
D. Evaluation Against Attacks
All LLC-based cross-VM covert channels [15], [16], [20],
[21], [49] fail to meet requirement 2. These cannot meet re-
quirement 3 as they exploit caches’ set-associativity. Ristenpart
et al. [15] and Xu et al. [16] require accessing (privileged) page
tables in order to find congruent addresses, thus they also fail
to meet requirement 4.
The memory order buffer (MOB) covert channel [22] de-
pends on the availability of SMT. This attack fails to meet
requirements 1 and 3. The DRAM row-buffer [19] and mem-
ory controller [23] attacks fail to meet requirements 1 and 4.
Both rely on cache flushing in order to force memory accesses
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TABLE I: Cross-VM covert channel attacks against covert
channel countermeasures.
Attack Exploited resource R1 R2 R3 R4
[15] Last-level cache - - - -
[16] Last-level cache - - - -
[17] Memory bus -   -
[18] Memory bus -   -
[19] Row-buffer -   -
[20] Last-level cache - - - -
[21] Last-level cache - - - -
[22] MOB -  - -
[23] Memory controller -   -
[49] Last-level cache - - - -
Ours Memory bus    
being served from DRAM, and the memory controller covert
channel exploits a forbidden microarchitectural component.
To the best of our knowledge, all existing covert channels
rely on the rdtsc instruction and thus fail to meet require-
ment 1 and 4. Also, the memory bus covert channel proposed
by Wu et al. [17] doesn’t meet requirement 4 as they did not
specify how they implemented uncached memory accesses—
hence we assume that they proceeded with the clflush
instruction. Liu et al. [18] claimed that their own memory
bus covert channel can be closed by injecting noise in timers.
We show in this paper that it is still possible to design the
covert channel while bypassing their defence strategy.
More generally, the memory bus covert channel was initially
designed in order to overcome the drawbacks of cache-
based attacks, namely the addressing uncertainty (e.g. un-
privileged virtual-to-physical address translation in virtualised
environment), the scheduling uncertainty (e.g. synchronisation
errors), and cache physical limitations (e.g. exploiting the L1-
D doesn’t allow cross-core communication). In this paper,
we demonstrate that it also enables bypassing state-of-the-art
countermeasures against timing channels.
IV. A RESILIENT MEMORY BUS COVERT CHANNEL
A. Adversary Model
There are two communicating entities, a sender and a
receiver. The sender exists in the victim’s environment in the
form of a trojan or any other form of malicious program.
The receiver exists in the attacker’s environment. Both com-
municating entities execute without privileges. The instances
of the victim and the attacker are scheduled on separate
cores of the same processor. The hypervisor is assumed
to be free of any software vulnerability, and instances are
logically separated. Thus sender and receiver do not share
any memory region. Finally, it is assumed that state-of-the-
art countermeasures are operating in the environment of both
the sender and the receiver, and that these countermeasures
impose the requirements listed in Section III.
B. The Memory Bus Lock
In a multi-threaded application, shared memory regions may
be accessed concurrently. In order to prevent undesirable situ-
ations such as race conditions, instructions can be performed
atomically. In an atomic memory operation, the requested
cache line is locked in order to prevent its modification by
another thread. A singularity occurs when accessing a memory
region which spans across two cache lines.
Wu et al. [17] observed that, upon accessing a cache line-
crossing region (a.k.a. exotic), atomicity was enforced by
locking the memory bus. By guaranteeing exclusive access
of the shared bus to one thread, others would be unable to
modify the cache lines of interest. When the exotic operation
is completed, the memory bus is unlocked.
Moreover, Wu et al. [17] noticed that a similar behaviour
happens on modern processors, where the front-side bus has
been removed (i.e. NUMA processors). Atomic accesses to
exotic regions result in every outstanding load/store operation
to be completed across all CPUs before the atomic operation
is performed [50]. This strategy effectively guarantees that no
other memory operation can affect the cache lines of interest.
However, it also introduces significant timing variations which
are visible across all CPUs.
A covert channel can be created based on the effect of
exotic memory accesses: a one is transmitted by generating
atomic operations on a cache line-crossing region, a zero is
transmitted by remaining idle for a fixed amount of time.
Concurrently, the receiving-end probes its own accesses and
interprets low and high latency accesses as zeroes and ones.
C. From Timing Variations to Binary Information
Wu et al. [17] designed a cross-VM covert channel based
on the memory bus lock behaviour. However, as described in
Section III-D, their covert channel can be closed with various
countermeasures. Here, we demonstrate how to design the
memory bus covert channel in a way that meets requirements
1 to 4. The covert channel can be broken down into two
primitives:
1) Sending-end: in order to force atomicity, a lock prefix
can be attached to an instruction. The lock signal can only
be applied to read-modify-write operations whose destination
operand is a memory location. Read-modify-write operations
combine a load, an arithmetic, and a store operation. We
choose the xchg instruction which simply swaps the contents
of its two operands, and automatically asserts a lock signal if
the first operand is a memory location. In order to transmit
a one, contention is generated by passing to the assembly
function (Listing 1) a pointer with a base address aligned on a
cache line boundary added with an offset of 63 bytes. In order
to transmit a zero, the same assembly function can be passed a
pointer with a base address aligned on a cache line boundary.
Also, promoting the operation to 64-bit wide with the rex.w
prefix allows reducing the global time of execution by half.
1 ; RDI = pointer to exotic or "normal" region
2 REX.W XCHG [RDI], RAX
3 RET
Listing 1: Transmitting a symbol.
2) Receiving-end: the x86 Streaming SIMD Extension pro-
vides instructions to perform direct read and write opera-
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tions to main memory without affecting the cache. A non-
temporal store of double quadword from an xmm register into
a 128-bit memory address is performed with the movntdq
instruction [51], [52]. The receiver can use this instruction
to accelerate the probing and reduce errors due to cache
pollution of other processes (see Listing 2). More importantly,
it prevents the cache-miss hardware performance counter from
incrementing, inhibiting countermeasures based exclusively on
the monitoring of cache activity. The mfence (lines 4 and
6) instruction plays two important roles. Firstly, it prevents
re-ordering between the non-temporal store (line 5) and the
reading of the counter (lines 3 and 7). Secondly, it allows
flushing the write-combining (WC) buffer, thus ensuring of
the execution of the non-temporal store in-order. Non-temporal
operations follow WC semantics, which specify that data must
not be cached so as to reduce cache pollution (i.e. when data is
used only once). Non-temporal operations are combined in the
WC buffer, and delayed until the buffer becomes full, or upon a
serialising event (e.g. mfence, cpuid, lock, etc.) [51]. We
note that the size of the WC varies from one microarchitecture
to another, however it can take the size of several cache lines
and one single movntdq might not be enough to fill it up.
Thus the second mfence instruction (line 6) ensures that the
non-temporal store is not delayed until the WC buffer is full.
1 ; RSI = pointer to counter
2 ; RDI = pointer to "normal" region
3 MOV RDX, [RSI]
4 MFENCE
5 MOVNTDQ [RDI], XMM0
6 MFENCE
7 MOV RAX, [RSI]
8 SUB RAX, RDX
9 RET
Listing 2: Receiving a symbol.
In order to discard the usage of the TSC counter, we replace
it with a counting thread using the inc instruction (see Listing
3). The counter value is systematically written to memory, so
as to make it visible to the receiving-end. We note that this will
require the receiver to have access to a second logical CPU,
and that it does not alter the resolution of measurements—in
fact it can even improve it [53].
1 ; RDI = pointer to counter
2 XOR RBX, RBX
3 _LOOP:
4 INC RBX
5 MOV [RDI], RBX
6 JMP _LOOP
Listing 3: Counting thread.
The proposed protocol is presented in Algorithm 1. The
sender performs atomic memory accesses either in a cache
line-crossing region (i.e. exotic) or in a single cache line
(i.e. normal), with the Access function referring to Listing 1.
Meanwhile the receiver starts the counting thread, and probes
memory accesses into a single cache line of its own userspace,
with the Probe function referring to Listing 2. We note that
sender and receiver perform multiple accesses per bit value.
Algorithm 1: Memory Bus Covert Channel Protocol
MS1: exotic memory region (sender userspace);
MS0: normal memory region (sender userspace);
MR: normal memory region (receiver userspace);
send[N ], recv[N ]: respective buffers of sender and receiver;
Sender
for all i ∈ [0;N ] do
if send[i] == 1 then
{Exotic access}
Access( MS1 );
else
{Normal access}
Access( MS0 );
end if
end for
Receiver
for all i ∈ [0;N ] do
{Timed normal access}
t = Probe( MR );
if t > threshold then
recv[i] = 1;
else
recv[i] = 0;
end if
end for
The entire premise of the covert channel is based on the
ability for the receiver to observe a timing variation depending
on the sender’s activity. In our AWS EC2 m5d.large instance
pair (see Table II), the receiver’s accesses to DRAM take
an average of 935 increment iterations when the sender is
inactive, and 2403 increment iterations when the sender is
active. Therefore, there is an average performance overhead of
1468 increment iterations per memory access. An increment
iteration is the time that it takes for the counting thread to
perform one increment operation (see Listing 3). On the AWS
EC2 m5d.large, we measured that it takes 1498034 CPU cycles
to perform 220 iterations, that is an average of 1.42 CPU cycles
per increment operation. This means that overhead caused by
the sender’s activity amounts to 2084 CPU cycles. Thus it is
trivial for the receiver to differentiate the binary values sent
across the covert channel.
V. EVALUATION
A. Channel Capacity
The testing environments are summarised in Table II. It con-
sists of three AWS EC2 instance pairs featuring different x86-
64 microarchitectures, namely Intel Xeon E5-2676v3 (released
in 2015), Intel Xeon Platinum 8175 (released in 2017), and
AMD EPYC 7571 (released in 2019). The tests are repeated
on each instance pair. Both the sender and the receiver run
in their own instance and have access to two virtual CPUs
(vCPUs). Furthermore, dedicated instances are used in order
to ensure that sender and receiver are scheduled on the same
processor.
TABLE II: Hardware configuration (AWS EC2).
Instance type Microarchitecture vCPUs Frequency
m4.large Intel Xeon E5-2676v3 2 2.4 GHz
m5a.large AMD EPYC 7571 2 2.5 GHz
m5d.large Intel Xeon Platinum 8175 2 3.1 GHz
The error rate (Figure 3a) is computed by counting the
number of bit flips over a 256-bit message. At a bitrate of
480 bps, the covert channel reaches an error rate as low as
5.46% on the Intel Xeon Platinum 8175 platform. The channel
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(a) Error rate (%) as a function of the bit rate (bps).
(b) Channel capacity (bps) as a function of the bit rate (bps).
capacity (Figure 3b) is computed under the binary symmetric
model [54]. It measures the quantity of information that can
be reliably transmitted by accounting for the error rate1. At
a bitrate of 480 bps, the covert channel reaches a capacity of
up to 333 bps on the Intel Xeon Platinum 8175 platform. The
same order of magnitude as the original proposal is achieved
[17]. Results are summarised in Table III.
TABLE III: Error rate and capacity (raw bitrate of 480 bps).
Instance type Microarchitecture Error rate Capacity
m4.large Intel Xeon E5-2676v3 8.31% 281 bps
m5a.large AMD EPYC 7571 12.3% 221 bps
m5d.large Intel Xeon Platinum 8175 5.46% 333 bps
B. Effects on Microarchitectural States
The proposed covert channel successfully meets all the
requirements previously established:
Requirement 1: Noise injection on timers. A high res-
olution timer is required in order to measure the latency of
performing memory accesses. A timing channel can effectively
be mitigated if the values read from this counter are too
noisy. Requirement 1 intends to prevent such countermeasure.
In order to gain assurance that neither the rdtsc nor the
rdtscp instructions are used, we disassembled the entire
binaries and were able to confirm that these instructions are not
present. The receiving-end relies exclusively on the counting
thread in order to benchmark the execution of memory ac-
cesses, and there are no other benchmarking operations taking
place in the code. Only the evaluation of the channel capacity
1In brief, the capacity of a binary symmetric channel is a function of its
binary entropy, i.e. a function of the error rate which represents the uncertainty
over the quality of the information received. Maximum entropy is reached
when the probabilities of a bit being erroneous and correct are equal.
requires using the TSC counter. Beyond the testing phase, this
operation is not required.
Requirement 2: Noise injection on caches. The covert
channel is based on the ability for the sender and receiver
to manipulate and observe microarchitectural states. In the
case of cache-based covert channels, this microarchitectural
state is the presence of a cache line in a cache set. Injecting
noise in caches, such that the receiver and sender can loose
the above-mentioned capability, can effectively mitigate the
attack. Requirement 2 intends to thwart such countermeasures.
The sending-end exploits the bus locking behaviour for atomic
accesses to cache-line crossing regions (see Section IV-B). The
resulting performance cost is generated system-wide. Thus all
memory accesses are impacted, whether they target caches
or DRAM. Also, the receiving-end benchmarks uncached ac-
cesses only. On x86 microarchitectures, non-temporal instruc-
tion are designed to fetch data directly to DRAM. Therefore,
noise injection in caches does not affect the microarchitectural
state leveraged by the sender and receiver, since they only
communicate via DRAM accesses. Noise injection on caches
would be completely oblivious to this covert channel.
Requirement 3: Software partitioning. Software partition-
ing enforces spatial isolation over certain processor resources,
such that co-tenants cannot share a vulnerable microarchitec-
tural state. Requirement 3 accounts for such countermeasures,
some of which are already deployed by cloud providers. We do
not have control over the disabling of SMT on the commercial
platform, and dedicated instances from the same AWS account
may share hardware CPUs. Therefore, we reproduce the covert
channel in a lab environment, such that SMT can be disabled
and processes can be pinned to separate hardware CPUs. The
covert channel was successfully launched across two native
processes on an AMD Ryzen Threadripper 1950X processor
(Zen), which features 16 cores. SMT was disabled from the
BIOS menu, and each communicating was set to different
cores via the (privileged) taskset command. We note that
this command was only used for the testing of this require-
ment, and that it is not necessary when launching the attack
across VMs. This shows that the covert channel allows cross-
core communication, hence it cannot be mitigated by disabling
SMT. Finally, the cache architecture (e.g. set-associative) is
not relevant with the memory bus. Firstly, because it does not
rely on modulating a shared cache set. And secondly, because
non-temporal accesses bypass the cache on x86 platforms.
Therefore, cache colouring cannot have a mitigating effect on
the proposed covert channel.
Requirement 4: Hardware partitioning. This requirement
considers different forms of partitioning which would be
enforced at the hardware level, from isolated cache partitions
through time-multiplexing on certain scheduling resources to
privileged instructions. The tests were performed from user ac-
counts, and the disassembling of our binaries showed that nei-
ther the rdtsc nor the clflush—theoretically privileged—
are used. While the memory controller is solicited in DRAM
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accesses, it is not responsible for generating timing variations.
Thus time-multiplexing over the memory controller or the
interconnect cannot conceal timing variations caused by the
bus lock behaviour. As for cache partitions, these are irrelevant
with the proposed attack since timing variations do not cause
any cache accesses.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Closing the Memory Bus Covert Channel
A new feature known as Memory Bandwidth Allocation
(MBA) has been introduced in Intel Xeon Scalable processors
[55]. This feature allows controlling the memory bandwidth
of each core, and could be leveraged in order to inhibit the
memory bus covert channel. The advantage of this approach
is that it relies on existing hardware support, much like Liu
et al. [36] used the Intel Cache Allocation Technology (Intel
CAT) feature in order to close PRIME+PROBE cache attacks.
We note that Intel CAT was also used by Lipp et al. [56] as
a Rowhammer enhancer, who then suggested to modify Intel
CAT in order to mitigate the vulnerability. It is possible that
Intel MBA could also lead to new vulnerabilities, as many
other hardware optimization techniques did, e.g. out-of-order
execution, SMT, prefetching, etc. Finally, Intel MBA is not
available on all Intel microarchitectures.
B. The Case of ARMv8.2-A
ARM processors have recently arrived on cloud platforms
with the Neoverse microarchitectures. Thus we can expect
that the share of x86 processors in IaaS will decrease for
the benefit of ARM architectures. We tried reproducing the
memory bus covert channel across two AWS EC2 instances
platform featuring a 64-bit ARM architecture. It was possible
to re-create the receiving-end, the only exception being that
non-temporal instructions might not be guaranteed to be
served from DRAM. As for the sending-end, the A64 swp
instruction—equivalent of the x86 xchg—is deprecated since
the ARMv6 ISA. To the best of our knowledge, this instruction
should be re-introduced in the ARMv8.2-A ISA or upcoming
versions, but it will no longer generate the desired system-wide
“bus lock”. We suspect that its behaviour will be similar to
the load-acquire store-release concept. Meanwhile, it has not
been possible to reproduce the timing channel on the Graviton
and Graviton2 processors.
VII. CONCLUSION & FURTHER WORK
In this paper, we analysed the existing set of covert channel
countermeasures, and identified how an adversary could by-
pass these defences. The x86 bus lock vulnerability was then
revisited in order to avoid influencing microarchitectural states
rendered unavailable by the latest mitigation strategies. The
covert channel was deployed in a commercial cloud environ-
ment, and tested across three different microarchitectures. This
study demonstrates that the proposed attack allows establishing
a rogue transmission channel across two cloud instances, even
if the extensive range of existing countermeasures was already
deployed. Finally, an approach to mitigating the remaining
vulnerability is proposed.
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